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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 18A- 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
V. 
CASA DE MARYLAND, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
MOTION TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THE 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND 
TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THIS MOTION 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the other federal parties, hereby 
moves, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 21, for expedited 
consideration of the petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit filed in 
this case. The petition for a writ of certiorari is being filed 
simultaneously with this motion. Because of the importance of the 
questions presented for review and the urgent need for their prompt 
resolution, the government moves for expedited consideration of 
the petition so that the petition may be resolved before the 
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Court's summer recess. The government also moves for expedited 
consideration of this motion and for this Court to order 
respondents to respond to this motion by Wednesday, May 29, 2019. 
Respondents have agreed to respond to this motion by close of 
business on -that date. 
1. a. This case is one of several pending before this 
Court concerning the policy of immigration enforcement discretion 
known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). See App. 
at 97a-101a, fl-IS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (Nov. 
5, 2018) (Regents App.) (June 15, 2012 memorandum). As discussed 
in the government's petition for a writ of certiorari, deferred 
action is a practice in which the Secretary of Homeland Security 
exercises enforcement discretion to notify an alien of the decision 
to forbear from seeking the alien's removal for a designated 
period. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 
U.S. 471, 483-484 (1999). DACA made deferred action available for 
a period of two years, subject to renewal, to "certain young people 
who were brought to this country as children." Regents App. 97a; 
see Id. at 99a-100a. The DACA policy made clear, however, that it 
"confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway 
to citizenship," because "[o]nly the Congress, acting through its 
legislative authority, can confer these rights." Id. at 101a. 
Since its inception in 2012, approximately 793,000 individuals 
have received deferred action under the DACA policy. Id. at 12a- 
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13a. As of September 2017, there remained approximately 689,000 
active DACA recipients. Id. at 13a. 
In 2016, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit holding that two related DHS deferred-action policies --
including an expansion of the DACA policy -- likely violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and were contrary to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and therefore should be 
enjoined. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per 
curiam). In September 2017, the former Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security determined that the original DACA policy would 
likely be struck down by the courts on the same grounds and that 
the policy was unlawful. Accordingly, she instituted an orderly 
wind-down of the DACA policy. Regents App. 111a-119a. 
Respondents brought this suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland challenging the rescission of 
DACA. They allege that the termination of DACA is unlawful because 
it is arbitrary and capricious under the APA; violates the APA's 
requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking; denies respondents 
equal protection and due process; and permits the government to 
use information obtained through DACA in a manner inconsistent 
with principles of due process and equitable estoppel. See Pet. 
App. 12a. Similar challenges have been brought in district courts 
in California, New York, and the District of Columbia. 
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b. The district court granted the government's motion for 
summary judgment in relevant part. Pet. App. 62a-98a. Although 
the court concluded that respondents' claims were justiciable, id. 
at 75a-79a, it rejected on the merits each of respondents' 
challenges to DACA's rescission, Id. at 81a-97a. The court 
reasoned that the rescission was exempt from APA's notice-and-
comment requirements because it represents the agency's guidance 
on the "exercise of discretion," not "a rule with the force of 
law." Id. at 82a. It rejected respondents' arbitrary-and- 
capricious challenge, observing that "[r]egardless of whether DACA 
is, in fact, lawful or unlawful," the agency's "belief that it was 
unlawful and subject to serious legal challenge is completely 
rational." Id. at 83a. And it concluded that respondents' 
allegation of discriminatory intent was "unsupported by the 
record," and that they otherwise failed to establish a violation 
of equal-protection, due-process, or estoppel principles. Id. at * 
93a; see id. at 84a95a.* 
* The district court also concluded that it was 
"theoretically possible" that the government might use information 
obtained from IJACA requestors in a manner inconsistent with 
estoppel principles, and therefore enjoined DHS to comply with the 
information-sharing policy as "first announced in 2012" pending 
further order from the court. Pet. App. 95a; 3/15/18 Am. Order 1; 
see Pet. App. 95a-97a. The court of appeals, however, vacated 
that injunction, and it is not at issue in the government's 
petition. Pet. App. 33a-35a. 
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C. On May 17, 2019, a divided panel of the court of appeals 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in 
part, and remanded. Pet. App. la-37a. The court first determined 
that respondents' claims were justiciable. Id. at 14a-25a. It 
acknowledged that, under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 82.1 (1985), 
an agency's decision whether "to enforce the substantive law" was 
presumptively "committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. 
701(a) (2) . Pet. App. 19a; see id. at 18a-19a. But the court 
concluded that the presumption was inapplicable here, because 
IJACA's rescission was a ",[m]ajor agency policy decision[] ," rather 
than an exercise of enforcement discretion "in an individual case." 
Id. at 20a. The court also concluded that the INA did not require 
that challenges to DACA's rescission await a final order of removal 
on the grounds that (1) the rescission of DACA was not a "'decision 
or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders'" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and 
(2) another judicial review provision in Section 1252, which 
requires "all questions of law and fact * * * arising from any 
action taken * * * to remove an alien" be resolved through 
"judicial review of a final [removal] order," 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (9), 
"'applies only with respect to review of an order of removal.'" 
Pet. App. 14a, 16a (citations omitted) 
On the merits; the court of appeals held that the APA's 
notice-and-comment requirements did not apply to DACA's rescission 
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because the rescission memorandum made a "general statement [I of 
policy," Pet. App. 26a (quoting 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (A)), rather than 
creating a "new binding rule of substantive law,". id. at 28a 
(citation omitted). But it held that the rescission was 
substantively arbitrary and capricious on the ground that DHS 
"failed to give a reasoned explanation for the change in policy." 
Id. at 31a. The court rejected DHS's reliance on the Texas 
litigation as justifying the change because DACA and the Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) policy, one of the two policies enjoined in the Texas 
litigation, "are not identical." Id. at 32a (citation omitted) 
And it criticized DHS for not "adequately account[ing] for the 
reliance interests" of individuals who would be affected by the 
rescission of the DACA policy. Id. at 33a. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district 
court's arbitrary-and-capricious ruling, vacated DACA's rescission 
in its entirety, and remanded the matter for "further proceedings, 
consistent with this opinion." Pet. App. 36a. In light of that 
disposition, the court of appeals "decline [d] to decide whether 
DACA's rescission violates the Fifth Amendment's due process and 
equal protection guarantees." Id. at 35a. Rather, the court 
"vacate[d] the district court's judgment on th[o]se issues and 
dismiss[ed] those claims." Id. at 37a. 
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Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented in part, 
concluding that "the rescission of ]JACA is judicially unreviewable 
under the APA." Pet. App. 42a; see Id. at 38a-61a. He rejected 
the majority's new "general enforcement policies" exception to the 
justiciability principles recognized in Chaney and other cases.' 
Id. at 49a. Judge Richardson noted that such an exception 
was irreconcilable with Chaney itself, which concerned "the FDA's 
categorical decision not to take enforcement action against a class 
of actors (drug manufacturers, prison administrators, and others 
in the drug distribution chain)" for the use of certain lethal- 
injection drugs. Id. at 50a. He also reasoned that such an 
exception was "untenable" as a logical matter, observing that 
"[sitandardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use their 
prosecutorial discretion does not alter its character." Id. 
at 51a. 
Judge Richardson determined that respondents' constitutional 
claims were reviewable, Pet. App. 56a n.6, but he had "little 
trouble" agreeing with the district court that they failed on the 
merits, Id. at 56a. He reasoned that respondents' due-process 
claim was meritless because they "fail[ed] to articulate a 
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest 
impacted by the rescission." Ibid. And he concluded that 
respondents' equal-protection claim faltered because they failed 
to create a "plausible inference" of invidious animus on the part 
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of the Attorney General or Acting Secretary in "tak[ing] the 
official government actions at issue," much less the showing of 
"outrageous discrimination" that would be required to establish 
what in essence is a selective-prosecution claim. Id. at 58a-59a. 
2. For the 'reasons explained in the government's petition 
for a writ of certiorari, expedited consideration of the 
government's petition is warranted. Twenty months ago, DHS 
determined, in accordance with the views of the Attorney General, 
that IJACA, a discretionary policy of immigration non-enforcement, 
was unlawful, ill-advised, and should be discontinued. That policy 
is materially indistinguishable from the DAPA and expanded IJACA 
policies that the Fifth Circuit held were contrary to federal 
immigration law in a decision that four Justices of this Court 
voted to affirm. Yet, as a result of two nationwide preliminary 
injunctions, the government ' has been required to sanction 
indefinitely an ongoing violation of federal law being committed 
by nearly 700,000 aliens pursuant to the DACA policy. And the 
very existence of this pending litigation '(and lingering 
uncertainty) continues to impede efforts to enact legislation 
addressing these issues. 
There is little question that these conditions, combined with 
the sheer importance of the questions presented, would ordinarily 
warrant this Court's prompt review. And, indeed, in February 2018, 
this Court recognized the' need for an "expeditious[] 11 resolution 
of this dispute. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 138 S. Ct. 
1182. Since November 2018, however, the government's petitions 
for writs of certiorari to the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to 
review this dispute have been pending before this Court. See D}{S 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); 
Trump v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); McAleenan v. 
Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed Nov. .5, 2018) . Briefing was 
completed on those petitions in early January 2019. And although 
the petitions were all filed as petitions for writs of certiorari 
before judgment, all parties agree that given the Ninth Circuit's 
intervening decision, the Regents petition is properly treated as 
an ordinary petition for a writ of certiorari after judgment. 
With yet another court of appeals to have now fully considered 
these issues, the government respectfully submits that further 
percolation is unnecessary and the time for the Court to act is 
now. Resolution of the pending petitions in Regents, NAACP, and 
Batalla Vidal before the summer, recess is critical, if the 
petitions are granted, to afford the government and the multiple 
private and state parties involved sufficient time to coordinate 
on a briefing schedule and to allow appropriate time for each side 
to address, and for the Court to consider and resolve, the many 
important issues presented by these cases. To be sure, the Court 
could allow briefing on this petition to proceed on the ordinary 
schedule, with a view to holding this petition while the Court 
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resolves any of the other pending cases in which it grants plenary 
review. But expedited consideration of this petition would permit 
the Court to consider it alongside the others at the Court's final 
June Conference and to determine whether, as the government's 
petition contends, it should be granted and consolidated with the 
cases in Regents and NAACP. 
For the foregoing reasons, the government moves that the 
Court adopt a briefing schedule that would require respondents to 
file a response to the government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari by June 4, 2019 -- 4 days longer than the government 
took to file the petition -- in order to allow the Court to consider 
the government's petition at its scheduled June 20, 2019 Conference 
for resolution of the petition before the summer recess. Through 
this motion, the government waives the 14-day period provided for 
in this Court's Rule 15.5 between the filing of a brief in 
opposition and the distribution of the petition and other materials 
to the Court. 
Finally, the government also respectfully requests 
expedited consideration of this motion. To allow for such 
expedited consideration, respondents have agreed to respond to 
this motion by close of business on Wednesday, May 29, 2019. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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NOEL J. FRANCISCO 
Solicitor General 
